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1. THE POPULIST POSITION
Social scientists concerned with West Africa in general, and with Nigeria in particular, of-
ten consider peasant societies as ,,class-less". Recent surveys revealed a remarkable de-
gree of social and economic inequality in the rural areas of Katsina-, Kano-, Zaria-, and
Sokoto Provinces, or in the ,,cocoa-belt" of Western Nigeria, to name just a few ex-
amples. Nevertheless these studies argue that this inequality does not manifest socio-
economic classes for a variety of reasons:
According to P. Hill, who represents the most outspoken position in this respect, class
formation may be considered as a function of social mobility: The structures of inequal-
ity, though being stable in the short run, have to break down under the pressure of speci-
fic counter-acting levelling forces inherent in the peasantry; the period of stability is said
to amount to about ten years but certainly not more than one generation, - last not least
because of the ,,death as the great leveller" (Hill, 1972: 161, 175-89; 1977: 156, 155-59;
cf. Nadel, 1942: 133 for similar arguments in the case of Nupe villages). Other authors
maintain that the peasantry is characterized by a common (class-) interest relative to more
powerful strata of the national or even international system (cf. Saul, 1973: 104/05;
Williams, 1977:2 86). Peasants form the bottom of a class hierarchy which transfers a con-
siderable proportion of the surpluses produced by the rural cultivators to dominant clas-
ses, whose power base (or at least its powerful support) is allocated outside the rural
economy (cf. Post, 1972: 226, 241). Even if a group of such farmers has emerged during
the past decades, - like in the ,,cocoa-belt" -, employing farm labourers throughout the
year and reinvesting considerable profits in farm-enterprises, Berry states that it would be
inadequate to consider these well-to-do farmers as a distinctive class of ,,capitalists":
first, because one important factor, which constitutes such a class, is lacking, i. e., the de-
velopment of the forces of production; and second, because farm labourers act strongly
on the demand side, and are therefore in such a strong bargaining position that they usu-
ally participate in the gains of their masters, and do not suffer from economic exploitation
(cf. Berry, 1975: 181/82, 134, 139-44, 117, 124, 203-05). Besides these points there are
several other, sometimes related propositions, which all point to the same direction:
e. g., capitalist farmers would have to rely on a class of resident landless labourers or at
least migrant farm labourers, - a rural proletariat, however, has not yet arisen (cf. Nor-
man, 1972: 38, 40; 1976: 51); land, the most important factor of production, is said to be
still communally owned; the employment of hired labour as well as the production for the
market is not a prerogative of capitalist farmers, and therefore such criteria do not fit for a
demarcation of classes (cf. Beer, 1976: 5-8), etc.
Although the authors quoted above adhere to quite different methodological positions
they nevertheless share one ,,populist" point of view: class-differentiation within the Ni-
gerian peasantry does not exist at present, and it is unlikely to develop in the forseeable fu-
ture (for a critique of the controversy between Populists and Marxists and for further
literature on this debate, cf. Harrison, 1975).
295The present study, however, wants to show by a critical examination of the theoretical
foundations of some of the positions mentioned above, that the notion of a class-less
peasantry in Nigeria might be based not so much on reality, but on an insufficient inter-
pretation of the historic-materialistic class-concept. With the growing number of
agro-economic surveys on Northern Nigeria the problem of socio-economic research
shifts from the often lamented lack of data to the lack of adequate concepts to analyse the
available information.
2. CRITIQUE OF WIDE-SPREAD CLASSIFICATION PATTERNS
The selection of criteria for the delimitation of classes will never be free of value judge-
ments, but will always be done to serve - explicitly or implicitly - certain analytical and
political purposes. The claim of political abstinence within the scope of the means-end di-
chotomy has proved to be mere ideology from the methodological standpoint of historic
materialism, and in some cases the demarcation of classes even turned out to be instru-
mentalised policy par excellence. The following classification approach aims at providing
future research with some of the tools, which are necessary to predict specific class-ac-
tions and the possibility of alliances between different classes. The point of departure of
the following critique will be the historic-materialistic class definition, whose application
is not restricted to social structures or values of capitalist societies of 19th century
Europe. The appropriation of surplus-product is the sole foundation of this definition;
that means, it may be used for the investigation of any social structure in which appro-
priation of surplus-product is existent, - be it feudalist-, capitalist-, or socialist relations
of production. The actual form of the appropriation of surplus labour determines both
the character of a certain class and the choice of adequate empirical indicators for the de-
limitation of classes.
If the subsequent sections deal with ,,farm labourers", ,Capitalist farmers", ,,poor
peasants", etc., then we are not concerned with isolated social individuals but with indi-
viduals as class members, i. e., withpersons only as far as they are ,,per Bonifications of
economic categories, holders of certain class relations and interests" (Marx, K., Works
(MEW), vol. 23:16). Class-interest, then, is not a direct function of social mobility, e. g.,
of varying chances of peasant- or landlord-families to go through different classes during
their life-time or in the sequence of generations. The question of ,,mobility" is relevant
for the solution of our problem only in so far, as a high average degree of mobility may
build up considerable constraints on the way to the emergence of subjective class-con-
sciousness, - and therewith it may hamper political actions of a class seriously (cf. Chap-
ter 4.4); however, concerning the existence of the class ,,in itself" and of an objective
class-interest the ,,mobility-question" is irrelevant.
Wage labourers and capitalists are a chief product of capital's realization process. Relations of ex-
ploitation between both of these classes do not result from an unfavourable labour-market forcing
workers to sell their labour power below its value; but exactly the exchange of labour to its (repro-
duction-) value for its higher use-value forms the basic condition for the profit realization.
Although a high wage bill may tend to retard the accumulation of capital in the countryside and
therefore, too, the dissolution-process of the peasantry, - any attempt, to consider the question of
class-formation as a function of the market price of the commodity ,,labour", will necessarily fail.
On the other hand one should not take the mere existence of a labour contract between landlord
and peasant as the dawn of a new rural-capitalist society. Day-labourers and ,,free" (i. e., free from
any means of production) peasant-workers who exchanged their labour for money did (and do) exist
also in pre-capitalist modes of production, - even in Europe (cf. Marx, ,,Grundrisse", pp. 466-70;
MEW 23: 762-66). Although the pay of these ,,free hands" was certainly reduced in many cases to
the absolute minimum, determined by the costs to maintain their life, and although their masters
sold part of the workers product and thus created exchange value, the production took place mainly
to create direct (or indirect) use-value (e. g., luxury goods) for the nobility. Labour in all these cases
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vate consumption needs of the upper class. Hardly anyone would consider these conditions as capi-
talist relations of production: For only if the exchange of labour power as use-value for its exchange -
(i. e. reproduction -) value becomes the content and primary aim of the exchange itself, - if the pur-
chase of alien labour to sustain the production process gains pre-eminence over immediate 'consump-
tion needs, and if extra-economic coercion does not govern anymore employment-relations, - then,
and only then, ,,wage-labour" in the meaning of political economy constitutes itself
1.
There exists another bias in West African analyses of rural inequality, — which often becomes ar-
ticulated in a veiled form only —, to the effect that the demonstration of the existence of a landless
proletariat in the countryside would be a precondition for a discussion on rural stratification in terms
of (capitalist) class-formation (cf. Tiffen, 1976:118; Hill, 1972:175, 193; 1977:175, 219). -But even
in the stage of early capitalist development in Europe, from which this stereotype may have been de-
rived, farm labourers who owned small parcels of land have been the rule rather than the exception,
as the example of the Instleute, HHusler or Biidner in Germany might show, who were tied down to
the soil to prevent them from migration and in order to reduce the wage-bill. In France the propor-
tion of farm-labourers with landed property has been estimated to amount to about 75 % at the end
of the 19th century. The most important source, however, which contributed to avoid seasonal la-
bour-bottlenecks in agricultural production of Europe at that time was not a class of resident landless
labourers, but migrant workers (cf. Collins, 1969; Kautsky, 1899, chap. VII; Lenin, Works, vol. 3:
172-75).
A fourth position which considers the social structure of African countries mainly from the angle
of a postulated main-contradiction between imperialism and the Third World, similarly arrives at
misleading results: This view, which is widespread, especially among scholars of the ,,dependency
approach", has the tendency to underestimate the present state of rural class differentiation or even
to negate it a priori,
Its point of departure for the delimitation of classes is not the actual production-process in the
countryside but the supposed class-interest of certain strata of the society. According to this point ol
view rural development in West African States is characterised by stagnant domestic food produc-
tion and an export-crop economy, dominated by the requirements of the world market. This
neo-colonial economy is said to preserve tribute paying modes of production; poor and rich farmers
alike, in short,, the peasantry as a class", is exploited by the state, feudalist landlords, and/or the in-
ternational bourgeoisie (cf. Amin 1973:191-93; Williams, 1977:286). Therefore it does not surprise
that this approach frequently leads to a confusion of partial common interests of different classes, di-
rected alike against imperialistic dominance, for the class-interest of an undifferentiated ,,peasantry"
in itself (cf. Shiviji, 1975: 12-14; Williams, 1976: 139-45).
The dominance of the economy of developing countries by imperialism and the urban bourgeoi-
sie may cover the antagonism between local exploiters vis a vis poor and middle farmers in the vil-
lages, because all rural classes involved, share common interests in the struggle for national economic
independence; it seems to be inadequate, however, to deduce the definition of classes only from a
different weight of contradictions within a country or the wourld economy. Such a position would
be idealistic:
It would deny the existence of classes within the peasantry just because the capitalist farmer has
been exploited too, e. g., by the state or by the international bourgeoisie within the scope of an
,,unequal exchange". Starting from the correct insight that rural relations of exploitation are not
confined to the village level, this approach regards only,,major" class divisions as being relevant and
treats the two- or threefold fleeced poor peasant as being equal to the latter's capitalist fellow-coun-
tryman.
The thesis of this study is neither that it will be possible to prove that all,,peasant so-
cieties" in West Africa will reveal more or less clear cut class-distinctions, nor to deny that
certain structures, postulated by the ,,dependency-approach", like the lack of a domestic
market, insufficient profitability of agricultural production, stagnation of domestic food
production or impoverishment of the peasantry without proletarisation, might occur
1 In this light it may appear less difficult to owing to caste considerations or who hire la-
integrate the so-called ,,exceptional cases" into bourers on exchange basis. All these persons
a consistent class model which are quoted time have in common that they do not strive for pro-
and again, i.e., the cases of employers of farm fit, - that they struggle for survival, not as capi-
labourers like widows, old or disabled peasants, talists but as human beings,
poor farmers who will not do manual work
297;ven in certain regions of the Nigerian ,,Middle Belt". I hold, however, that it will not
serve the better understanding of social laws of development, if the dependence-rela-
ionship mentioned above is claimed to be valid also for the still overwhelming majority
}f regions for which no or but insufficient analyses are available. By patient empirical
investigation into rural social systems it might very well be possible to discover tendencies
:ounteracting the dependence-mechanism; the case study of rural Nupeland given below
^s meant to be a first step in this direction.
3. CRITERIA FOR THE EMPIRICAL DELIMITATION OF CLASSES
Official agricultural statistics in Nigeria still take the seemingly equal distribution of land,
which is supposed to be derived from the ,,communal land-tenure system", as index for
the non-existence of economic stratification of the peasantry (cf. ,,Rural Economic Sur-
vey of Nigeria-Consolidated Report of the Land Tenure Enquiries, 1965-68", Federal
Office of Statistics (F.O.S.), Lagos, 1972: 1, 2). But there is a growing awareness, even
among non-marxist scientists, that cultivated area may be a misleading index of rural stra-
tification (cf. Matlon, 1979: 67). The unsatisfactory results of the investigation of agrarian
structures by means of neo-classical or neo-populist theories recently caused two au-
thors, engaged in the ongoing debate on the development of agrarian capitalism in India,
to develop new concepts for the analysis of the differentiation of the peasantry on the em-
pirical level (cf. Patnaik, 1976; Schoer, 1977). Patnaik's ,,labour-exploitation ratio" as
well as Schoer's ,,resource position index" may be regarded as remarkable progress, as
these indices are meant to go down to the grass-roots of the actual exploitative behaviour
and the overall resource position of the peasants respectively. Both concepts, however,
still have some shortcomings, which cannot be discussed here (for a detailed critique cf.
Kohnert, 1980). The following construction of a ,,net-exploitation index" is intended to
correct these shortcomings.
3.1 The net-exploitation index
If the models quoted above do not offer any better solution of the problems related with
the classification of the peasantry than the ,,classics" they refer to, there is no good reason
why one should not go back to the class concept developed by Lenin and Mao them-
selves
2. Then again the task remains to adopt this concept to the specific conditions of
Nupeland and to transform it to a more formalised version.
The relation of income from exploitation to self-produced family income will be the
base of the classification model suggested here. It is assumed that in developing regions
like Nupeland the main source of income determines the class-position and -interest of a
peasant in the overwhelming number of cases. Wealth and capital will be considered only
so far as they contribute directly to the family income or to the extent they appear to be of
absolute necessity for delimitating purposes.
Employment of wage labour is considered to be the main index of exploitative income:
first, because it seems to be the most important and widespread source of expropriated la-
bour among Nupe peasants; and second, because it is under the prevailing conditions the
most direct and characteristic criterion of the rural capitalist development which is dawn-
ing at present in Nupeland. To prevent confusion between ,,wage-labour" in the sense of
2 Cf. Lenin, ,,New data on the laws of de- tics for dealing with rich peasants", vol5:24/25;
velopmentof capitalism in agriculture", Works, cf. also the official ,,explanations" of the Chi-
vol. 22, and ,,Development of capitalism in nese Council of People's Commissars
Russia", Works, vol. 3; Mao Tse-tung, ,,How ,,concerning the differentiation of class status in
to differentiate classes in the village", Col. the countryside", App. to ,,The Agrarian Re-
Works, vol. 1; ,,The present situation and our form Law of the People's Republic of China",
tasks", vol. 4;,,Request for opinions on the tac- Peking, 1950.
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cessary to introduce additional conditions for the definition of a ,,capitalist" peasant
household: As capitalist shall be considered a farmer who
(a) employs hired labour primarily to make profit (to expropriate surplus-value) and not just to se-
cure his own reproduction, i. e., the survival of himself and his familiy, and
(b) reinvests the expropriated surplus-value at least to that extent in his farm, that the value of his
productive consumption (raw-material, fertilizer, seed, expenditure on tractor hiring service
(T.H.U.), etc.) p.a. is significantly above the level of productive consumption of an average
peasant
3.
As landlords shall be defined all families which mainly live on appropriated surplus-
product produced by other means than wage labour, without suffering from want of any
means of existence. Poor peasants and farm labourers shall be considered as those classes
which do not dispose over sufficient resources to meet the requirements of their own re-
production, or have to earn most of their income by working as hired farm labourers.
Middle peasant families, on the other hand, earn their living mainly by employing their
own labour and their own resources.
Apparently it would be inappropriate to define only such economic units as farm-
households, which earn the major part of their income in agriculture. Because under that
precondition even landlords or rich peasants might be excluded from the investigation, if
their non-farm income exceeds their farm income. However, if everybody who earns an
income from agriculture which is worth mentioning (e. g., more than half of the ,,necess-
ary product") is to be counted as peasant, it will be advisable, - at least concerning
middle- and rich peasants -, to separate between their class-position in agriculture and
their possible class-position in other sectors of the economy. Two arguments support this
separation:
First, as mentioned above, the class definition should try to reflect not just the present
situation but also facilitate the analysis of the direction of the dissolution-process of the
peasantry. One would, however, tend to overestimate the development-potential of (ca-
pitalist) agriculture, if even the owner of a rice-mill or any businessman with farm income
would be classified as rural capitalist only because his overall position in the economy is a
capitalist one. Second, an industrial capitalist or a self-employed (teacher, crafts-man,
etc.) with agricultural secondary income may occupy a completely different political po-
sition within and outside the agricultural sector
4. Disregarding the total resource position
of a farmer, on the other hand, may also lead to an underestimation of his future devel-
opment-potential; for example, if the profitability of agricultural production should in-
crease relatively to other spheres of investment, this could cause an inflow of merchant
capital into agricultural enterprises; - it is hold, however, that the advantages of the method
mentioned above do outweigh this disadvantage.
For the purpose of class-delimitation the following definitions are given
5,:
3 The problem, whether „accumulation" is ture of capitalist development. Concerning the
to be considered as a necessary condition for the Nupe, however, this delimitation problem is of
definition of capitalist relations of production secondary importance, as in over 90 % of the
has been discussed to some length in the debate rich peasant households, - determined without
on the development of rural capitalism in India, the accumulation criterion -, at least parts of the
cf. Chattopadhyay, 1972; Patnaik, 1976. A profit flow back into agriculture; this is already
peasant may appropriate under certain condi- sufficient to lift the value of the means of pro-
tions surplus-value from hired labour on a large duction employed by that households signifi-
scale and nevertheless may not invest it on his cantly above the average.
farm but in other - more profitable - spheres of 4 Cf. Mao, Col. Works, vol. 5:213, 224; Su
investment like trading, construction or trans- Hsing, 1968. 2: 18-20; Ho Tsai, 1957.
port. Although, of course, such a farmer would 5 All definitions are related to the peasant-
be a capitalist too, it is thought to be inappro- family, - i. e., ,,those people eating from the
priate to include him in the class of rich peas- same pot", according to the definition adopted
ants, since this class is meant to provide insight by the F.O.S., Lagos-, and to the period of one
not just into the status quo, but also into the fu- year.The necessary product be the net-income which is necessary for the reproduction of family la-
Dour; of course this value depends on the different regional socio-economic conditions. In Nupeland
:he average daily wage of a farm labourer, multiplied by the number of working days p. a, of the
itandardized labour power of a peasant family, is considered to be a reasonable approximation of the
lecessary product. As the traditional efako labour system of the extended family in Nupeland is pre-
sently subjected to a rapid dissolution, there are considerable variations - depending on the number
}f family members - concerning the value of the necessary product.
The family income consists out of agricultural and non-agricultural income. The agricultural
let-income be the gross value of production of a farm-household less the cost of production (family
labour does not count as cost-factor here) plus secondary income from rent. The net-exploitation in-
iex be the value of the surplus-product produced by non-family labour in agriculture and
ippropriated by the family less the total value of the surplus-product produced by family labour for
athers.
The most convenient and direct way, to estimate the relation of appropriated surplus-product
and income of a farmer from his own labour, is considered to be the comparison of the actual labour
input. Therefore the delimitation will be made in labour-day equivalents, corresponding to the Chi-
nese Model or Patnaik's ,,outside labour index" (cf. ,,Agrarian Reform Law", Peking, 1959:17-50;
Patnaik, 1976: A 84).
If a farmer receives exploitation-income from other sources than wage labour, e. g., rent or usu-
rious interest (S), there is the possibility to convert this surplus product in labour-day equivalents (d)
as well, provided that there exist reasonable estimates on the average rate of surplus (r) and the wage
per day (w) (d = S/[r x w]). Of course such estimates provide only a very rough idea of the actual
quantity of exploited labour. The net-exploitation index (X), - expressed in labour-day equivalents
-, is equal to the number of non-family labour days employed in agriculture (d), minus the number
of labour days (farm and non-farm) worked for other people (t); (d-t) may be subdivided into net
wage labour days, net labour days appropriated (given away) by rent, usury, etc., analogous to Pat-
naik's ,,outside-labour index" (cf. Patnaik, 1976: A 84). Its aim is to facilitate the valuation of the
proportion of exploitation-income in the farm profit, and it is a decisive and necessary but not suffi-
cient criterion of delimitation in the class model suggested here.
The farm profit be the surplus-product produced by both self-employed family labour and non-
family labour; it is equal to the agricultural net income less the cost of family labour (valued at cur-
rent wage-rates) employed on the own farm.
The deviation of labour productivity and -intensity between family- and non-family
labour (as well as between different economic units) may gain considerable importance
even within one village. Because of the lack of sufficiently accurate data the following
analysis nevertheless has to assume that the variance will be in limits which allow — for our
classification purpose - to disregard these variations altogether. Since, however, the la-
bour productivity and therefore (c. p.) also the rate of surplus-value is likely to be higher
in rich farmers' households than in poor farmers' households — because of different means
and methods of production employed (cf. Hill, 1972: 108, 163; Matlon 1979: 78-82) -,
this assumption leads to an underestimation of the dissolution process of the peasantry
rather than to an overestimation.
The preceding assumptions form the basis of the following model of classes in a Nupe
village:
- Farm labourers: At least half of the total net income is derived from work as hired farm labourer.
- Poor peasant: The total net income is smaller than the necessary product. The main source of in-
come is agriculture.
- Middle peasant: (1) The net income is higher than or equal to the necessary product, and
(2) less than half of the net income is derived from rural wage labour, and
(3.0) the agricultural net income is smaller than the necessary product, or
(3.1) less than half of the farm profit consists of net-exploitation income, i. e., the net-exploita-
tion index is smaller than half the sum of non-family and self-employed family labour on the own
farm, or
(3.2) the value of the productive consumption on the farm is below or equal to the average level of
all peasant households.
- Rich peasant: (or capitalist farmer)
(1) The agricultural net income is higher or equal to the necessary product, and(2) at least half of the farm profit consists of net-exploitation income, i. e., the net-exploitation
index is higher than or equal to half the sum of non-family labour and self-employed labour on the
own farm, and
(3) rural wage labour forms at least half of the exploited non-family labour, and
(4) the value of the productive consumption on the own farm is higher than the average value in all
peasant households.
- Landlord: (1) and (2) like ,,rich peasant", and
(3) rural wage labour forms less than half of the exploited non-family labour.
In conclusion these definitions yield the following results: Farm labourers are always
subject to net exploitation; poor- and middle peasants usually get net exploited but may
appropriate surplus product of other peasants too, - the latter, however, does not surpass
the narrow limits set by the necessary product or the family labour power; rich peasants
and landlords are always net exploiters, - although they, as well as the other classes, may
get exploited by forces outside the agricultural sector of the economy.
3.2 On the operationally of the net-exploitation index
The model of class demarcation suggested here may appear somewhat unwieldy by sep-
arating agricultural- and non-agricultural income and by transforming income into la-
bour days. The operationality, however, does not necessarily suffer from this procedure.
Besides the advantages of the estimation of income-relations on the basis of labour-day
equivalents mentioned above, one might consider that additional evaluations on the sur-
plus produced outside agriculture by the peasants concerned would be required, in order
to be able to give up the separation between agricultural- and non-agricultural income.
This would increase the cost of investigation considerably. In addition it would prevent
secondary analyses of sample surveys like the surveys published by the Institute of Agri-
cultural Research (I. A.R.), Samaru, or other institutes in Nigeria, because, as a rule, data
on'secondary income are not disaggregated sufficiently in these studies.
The demands concerning the precision of the required data are not as stringent as it
may appear at first sight, because it is asked mainly for relations and less for exact absolute
figures; in surveying rich peasants or landlords, for example, a glance at the resource posi-
tion and the knowledge of the local conditions may suffice in many cases, to tell whether
the net farm-income of the farmer will exceed the necessary product or not; this again will
facilitate checks on the farmers' statements considerably.
The most difficult task will be the evaluation of income from exploitation: rent, trib-
ute, and interest are known as very sensitive data; there does exist a variety of religious,
social or economic reasons on both sides, which may cause the respondents to conceal ac-
tual dependence-relationships (cf. Chap. 4). Answers on this issue can hardly be checked
in the individual case, and one has to be content with very rough estimates. During the
survey of Nupe villages in 1976 even the investigation in the employment of hired labour
proved to be difficult, because poverty, which presses a poor farmer to work for money
for his well-to-do neighbour, is considered to be a shame; thus it happened that peasants,
who were known in the village to work many days p. a. as kwadago labourers (rural
wage-labourers), bluntly denied any such occupation when questioned in personal inter-
views; on the other hand middle- and especially rich peasants sometimes claimed, con-
trary to evidence, to do certain tasks on their field bv themselves, perhaps because they
wanted to boast of being a strong and achievement-oriented farmer, or because the want-
ed to understate their expenditures on hired labour, in order to underline their need for
credit from the Farm Center, which provided money on favourable conditions to selected
farmers. Both attitudes, however, are likely to result in an underestimation of the spread
of hired labour and c. p. of rural-capitalist development; besides detailed information on
the employment of family- and non-family labour is required in the class-models quoted
above as well, and therefore it cannot be considered as a special disadvantage of the sug-
gested classification-scheme.4. CLASSES IN RURAL NUPELAND
Nupeland or the Bida Emirate forms part of the Niger State north of the Niger river valley
between Jebba and Baro. It is situated in the ,,Middle Belt" or the guinea savannah of
Northern Nigeria. The vast swamps of the Niger as well as of the Kaduna and Gbako,
two other major rivers, which divide Nupeland from north to south, are among the hot-
test but at the same time most humid regions of Nigeria (cf. Nadel, 1942: 3). The Emirate
has some 500 000 inhabitants and the population density is relatively low with about 40
p/km
2 on the average.
The natural resources and modes of production in Nupeland are similar in many re-
spects to the conditions in the Emirates further to the north, and the political develop-
ment in the past has formed strong links between the Fulani/Nupe rulers in Bida and their
traditional overlords in Gwandu or Sokoto as well. The Nupe-jihad at the beginning of
the 19th century, backed by troops from Gwandu, brought about far-reaching changes
concerning both the economic and political system of the Nupe (cf. Nadel, 1942; Mason,
1970). The development of a slave- und client economy and continuous slave raids by the
Fulani kings of Bida and their fiefholders during the latter half of the 19th century resulted
in a remarkable population-transfer from the Western- and Southern parts of the Nupe-
-Empire to the Bida region. The formation of so called ,,slave villages", tungazi, was one
of several other factors which tended to break through the regional isolation of the
subsistence economy of petty producers; in conjunction with the appropriation of the
surplus product of the peasantry by the ruling class in Bida it accelerated economic
growth and trade, - especially long-distance trade in slaves, arms, and horses as well as
textiles, cola-nuts, palm-oil, and shea-butter,-the major agricultural exports during this
century (cf. Mason, 1973).
When the troops of the ,,Royal Niger Company" conquered Bida during a ,,punitive
expedition" in 1897 because of growing disturbances of the Company's trade by the
Nupe raids, the Emirate fell into rapid disintegration. The British resident in Bida report-
ed, that in 1902 all villages to the west of the river Kaduna had thrown off their yoke of
serfdom and did acknowledge neither the authority of the Emir nor of the colonial power:
,,Farms were being deserted by the slaves and such was the state of unrest, that cultivation had
almost ceased. The Fulani ruling classes were rapidly becoming desperate of the state of the coun-
try. . ." National Archives, Kaduna (NAK), file: BIDANA, B 655, p. 3).
A further dissolution of the power of the traditional landlord class was prevented by
the British, who not only reinstated the Etsu Nupe (the Emir) but even strengthened his
authority in many respects (cf. Kohnert, 1980).
4.1 The land-tenure system
Among the Nupe there exists a long established distinction between the fertile but dry
uplands (lad) to the west of the Kaduna River (Trans-Kaduna), and the vast stretches of
valuable marsh-land (bata orfadama) situated to the east of the Kaduna (Cis-Kaduna).
Apart from other factors, like the distance from the capital, different degrees of access to
the market and to sources of secondary income, these variations in the use-value of land
have contributed to the development of different land-tenure systems in the western and
eastern parts of Nupeland.
In Trans-Kaduna the cultivation density is very low, with an estimated average of
20 % - even in the surroundings of most of the villages it probably does not exceed 60 %.
The low population pressure allows for long fallow periods of up to 15 years,- if the
,,bush land" then will be taken up again at all. The cultivation density in Cis-Kaduna of
50-100 % by far surpasses that of Trans-Kaduna, although even here there are regions,
like in the Bida, Wuya, Kuchi triangle, with densities of 0-10 %. Most of t\\efadama
fields are cultivated permanently, fallow periods seldom exceed three years.
At the time of the greatest territorial expansion and power concentration of the Bida
Emirate (1857-1901) the three rival royal houses of Bida and their fiefholders founded
about 1380 tungazi east of the Kaduna, in the surroundings of Bida, Lemu, Jima, etc. Theslaves and clients in these villages had not just to supply their absentee landlords with food
and tribute in kind, but had to produce for the market, too; thus they could get the cow-
ries which were demanded by their masters as additional monetary tribute, which enabled
the nobility of Bida to trade in arms, horses, etc., on an even larger scale, and to enhance
the effectiveness of their slave-raiding troops (cf. Mason, 1973: 457-66).
Starting under the reign of Etsu Masaba (1859-73), nicknamed as ,,Father of Distrib-
uting" by the Nupe peasants, the ruling class tailored the land-tenure system to meet the
requirements of the economic and political organisation of the Nupe state. The distrib-
ution of fiefs according to its value and geographical position was one of the most impor-
tant means by which the Fulani-dynasty could secure the loyalty of its followers as well
as the balance of power between fiefholders and the royal families on the one hand, and
the competing royal houses on the other hand (cf. Nadel, 1942: 117/18). Although this
fief-system underwent some transformations and restrictions in consequence of the abo-
lition of the slave trade (since 1897), the suppression of pawning of human pledges
(1933/34), and the official ban of tribute payments by the British (1906 and 1946), it ne-
vertheless remained intact to an astonishing degree
6.
Formally the legal fiction of ,,communal landownership" and the prohibition to sell
land, as included already in the colonial land laws, is still valid today; but it actually
amounts merely to the ultimate sovereignty of the Etsu Nupe and his council in all ques-
tions concerning land transactions in the Bida Emirate.
In reality two overlapping land-tenure systems exist in Nupeland, which hardly can be
compared with the communal tenure concept, which grants the tilling peasant only usu-
fructuary rights, whereas the land is held in trust and apportioned by the village chief. The
overwhelming number of farms in Trans-Kaduna as well as most village land in Cis-Ka-
duna has been owned by individual families for generations; these families can rent, pledge
or give away their land at will, although there are still some restrictions concerning land-
transactions with strangers. The relatively low use-value of land west of the Kaduna and
the growing distance from the capital, which made the political and military control of
slave-villages more difficult, are probably the main reasons why in Trans-Kaduna the
fief-system could gain a footing only in few fertile enclaves like the cola-plantations of
Labozhi or the oil-palm region of Yeti. Out of a total of 1591 tungazi founded in Nupe-
land during the 19th century just 13 % were situated in Trans-Kaduna districts (cf. Ma-
son, 1973: 459). As far as tribute payment is demanded today also in the uplands of the
Mokwa- or Kutigi districts, it is rather a symbolic sign of the recognition of the peasant's
loyalty vis a vis his former fiefholder than rent in the economic meaning: theNakorgi for
example, a high ranking titel-holder of the Fulani-dynasty in Bida, who ,,owns" among
others four hamlets to the east and south of Dabba, does receive at present not more than
1-2 bags of guinea corn as zakka (tribute) per village annually according to his own in-
formation.
Since the advent of colonial rule the British Residents of the Niger Province undertook
several futile attempts to destroy the fiefholder-system in Nupeland and to suppress
zakka payments, which the peasants had to pay besides the regular tax; the reasons be-
hind this policy were threefold: first, tribute obligations were suspected to constitute a
heavy drain on the potential revenue of the Bida Treasury, as had been shown by the
example of the ruthless exploitation of the peasantry in the course of the so-called ,,anti-
witchcraft-movements" (1910-20), organised by the ndako gboya in co-operation with
the Etsu, which left hardly any tax for the British and became so intolerable that the Resi-
dent had to forbid all performances of the cult
6". Second, tribute formed an additional
6 For a more detailed account of the devel- ndako gboya from a weapon of the peasantry
opment of the Nupe land-tenure system, see: against illegitimate power to an official cult in
Kohnert 1980. the hands of the Etsu, meant to suppress the
6a cf. Nadel, 1942: 126/27 and literature peasants cf. Kohner, 1980.
quoted there; on the transformation of thesource of income for the landlords which perpetuated their far-reaching autonomy in op-
Dosition to the colonial administration. Third, the British were afraid, that the peasants
night be driven into open rebellion by over-taxation through the ruling class in Bida:
,,. . . theEtsu should realize that, when they (the peasants, D.K.) becomefully alive to their sig-
nificance they are liable to take matters into their own hands." (Secretary Northern Provinces to Re-
sident, Niger Province, 4 Dec., 1945, NAK, BIDANA, B 1332).
Although Lugard boasted already in 1906, with regard to Nupe Division, that ,,The
aid fief-holders have been abolished; they numbered 76 . . ." (Lugard, F. D., 1907: 43),
le apparently was wrong, as in 1944 the British Administration had to admit officially
:hat the old fief-system was still very much alive:
,,It touches the personal interest of practically every senior member of the Bida Native Admin-
stration ... In my opinion official recognition of the system by which large tracts of land are alie-
lated from the peasantry would be as unconscionable as were the Enclosure Acts of the late 18th cen-
:ury in England . . ." (Senior District Officer (D.O.), Bida to Resident, Niger Province, 9 Aug.,
1944, NAK, ibid.).
According to a list compiled by the Etsu Nupe in 1945 at least 145 landlords existed in
Bida, who ,,owned" up to 20 villages each, all told 437 in Bida Emirate, from which they
received 1-250 bundles of guinea-corn p. a.
7. Although the British forced the Etsu in
1946 to tour his districts and to announce heavy sentences for the payment (!) or demand
sf zakka, there is no reason to suppose any substantial changes concerning the scale of the
fief-system up to now. The fight of the colonial power against the feudal relicts in North-
;rn Nigeria turned out to be half-hearted to say the best, since attacks on the economic
base of the landlords would have changed the co-operative attitude of the ruling class, -
on which the whole system of ,,indirect rule" depended -, into open hostility. So it does
not surprise that the publication of Adeniyi's findings that 59 % of the farmers still paid
zakka for more than 60 % of their farmland in the Jima/Doko - and Katcha Districts
(Cis-Kaduna) in 1969 (Adeniyi, 1972: 56), apparently made no impression at all, neither
on the State Government in Sokoto nor on the landlord class in Bida.
The opposition of the colonial administration against the relicts of the feudal economy
may, however, have contributed, - beside other factors like the low cultivation density
-,to the fact that in Nupeland up to now no share-crop arrangements with a strict rela-
tionship between economic yield and rent did emerge, - apart from a few enclaves in the
Fadama areas. Loyalty and respect for the landlord are still necessary conditions for the
continuation of the tenancy, and zakka had been paid by villages even for uncultivated
land (cf. Nadel, 1942: 194-46, Native Authority (N.A.) office, Bida to S.D.O., 5 Aug.
1944, NAK, ibid.). If tenant and landlord are from the same social stratum or if they are
on good terms, small presents suffice to get the right for cultivation of the land. Non-
payment, however, is hold to be a sign of open confrontation. A landlord will register
even the receipt of small gifts with great zeal, as in land disputes the N.A. Court in Bida
will give the land to the tiller, if the latter should be able to prove that the landlord or his
heirs have allowed the tribute to lapse for more than ten years without calling in the lease
(pers. inf., Makun Nupe). Under these conditions reliable data on zakka payments are
difficult to collect: the peasants are keen to give the impression that their tribute payments
are mere presents or religious obligations, in order to understate the real value of the tri-
bute, or to deny any tenancy-relationship; the landlords, on the other hand, tend to over-
state their demands as well as the payments received.
A field survey conducted by the author in 1976 yielded the following approximate
values tor zakka payments in Cis-Kaduna: First, an initial payment of Naira (N) 1-6 per
lati (upland farm) and N 10 per fadama farm; second, an annual rent in kind of 1—3
7 Cf. Etsu Nupe to D.O., Bida, 17 Dec., been understated for obvious reasons, as can be
1945, NAK, ibid.; both the quantity and the va- proved in some cases even today,
lue of the tribute and the number of villages hadbundles guinea-corn or 2—12 dana rice respectively
8. According to Makaman Bida, the
proportion of zakka in family farm-income does notexceed as a rule ofthumb 5% now-
adays; this is in accordance with more detailed accounts which cannot be given here.
The available data indicate that, with the exception of the enclaves mentioned above, the
actual average value oizakka has been declining for the past 30 years; it probably does not
correspond any more to the tithe traditionally demanded by the Koran.
Pledge of land is common today at least in the marsh-lands of Cis-Kaduna, - a peasant
in need of money will receive about N 15 and N 25 for one acre lati andfadama respecti-
vely. The sale of land is still illegal, although it is supposed to take place, covered by unli-
mited lease-contracts. Just two out of 210 peasants interviewed openly confessed the sale
of farm plots. Most farmers, however, know very well what they would pay for a piece of
land if they could buy it; in the Jima area, for example, on the average N 50 for about one
acre upland and two to three times as much for one acrefadama. The guidelines of the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Local Government (L.G.) -Minna for compensation
payments for land required by the state, may give some hints for the rocketing value of
agricultural land in the past decade: the upper limit of compensation payments for a one
acre rice farm was £ 20 in 1966, £ 100 in 1972, and £ 200 (or N 400) in 1976 (files on Land
Compensation, Farm Center, Bida).
Unfortunately the subsequent quantitative analysis of the social structure of Nupe vil-
lages has to exclude the absentee landlords although these may have a decisive influence
on the future agricultural development of Nupeland; this is considered to be a great dis-
advantage, but seems to be inevitable for the reasons given below:
(a) In none of the four villages surveyed there were resident landlords, who cultivated farms by their
own, or hired labour, apart from Lemu, were the District Head farmed some few acres of guinea-
corn and rice for self-consumption. Landlords therefore appear only indirectly in the social structure
of the villages concerned by the economic implications of their traditional landownership claims.
(b) Actual tribute obligations of the peasants are either not commensurable because parts of these
obligations are paid in social values and not in money or grain, or data deficiency - due to the sensiti-
vity of this issue - may allow an overall assessment but no detailed delimitation of the class position
according to the model suggested here. In Jima and Lemu, for example, only 24 % and 15 % of
peasants interviewed admitted to pay annual tribute for land farmed by themselves; the Village Head
of Jima, however, intimated to the author that, beside about 200 acres village land, all land around
Jima would be claimed by one or another landlord, and that more than half of the farms in the Jima
region were owned by a high ranking fiefholder, titled Tswankuku, from the Umaru-Majigi house, -
Cekpa being a second big landlord. Other reliable peasants expressed the view that,,everybody" in
the village would have to pay zakka to Tswankuku, usually two dana rice or two bundles of guinea-
corn, paid to a middleman, who comes at the beginning of the dry season to collect the tribute. The
D. H., himself a member of the reigning Majigi-house, informed the author that Tsoida, related to
the ,,greedy Masaba-family", would own one third of the land around Jima, whereas Tswankuku
would own ;ust a quarter, etc..
(c) The income of a big absentee landlord from rent may be up to five or eight times as high as the
average net income of an ordinary peasant: Tswankuku again, according to his own statement,
,,owns" about 12 km
2 of valuable marshland to the south of Jima, i. e., probably twice as much as
any other fiefholder in this area. About 400 peasants from five villages of the Jima/Doko district pay
1-5 dana rice as tribute to him. If one takes into account that another seven villages in Cis-Kaduna
pay allegiance to the Tswankuku family, then the latter probably derives the imposing gross-income
of N 2000-3000 p. a. from rent alone (it may be that part of the rent has to be given to the overlord of
the family, the Etsu Nupe). The appropriation of surplus product in the form of rent and in such di-
mensions, however, is restricted to a relatively small group of fiefholders. Spread over the mass of
tribute paying peasants the burden per farming unit usually does not exceed substantially the amount
of the community tax of N 4 for every male adult family member p. a.. Although this may still be a
heavy burden for the poor farmer, thepresent level of the rent will certainly not hamper future ru-
ral-capitalist development; in view of annual farm-expenditures of about N 350, tribute payments
8 The market-price of one bundle guinea- Tribute is a function of the social relationship
corn was N 1-3 in 1976, according to size and and the size and value of the farm,
quality, and of one dana rice up to N 1.50.would hardly affect the accumulation of a rich peasant. The uncertainty, whether it will be possible
to reap the fruits of investments, if the landlords should tend to develop a more „commercial" atti-
tude concerning their tenancy arrangements, is more likely to affect the accumulation-propensity of
a capitalist farmer.
(d) The economic significance of the landlord class for the future development of the dissolution-
process of the peasantry is probably to be seen not so much in the actual semi-feudal exploitation, the
scope of which is relatively modest, compared with other developing countries in Asia or Latin
America, - but in the claim of ownership over vast stretches of most valuable land in the Emirate. In
view of the present distribution of power these claims may be coined into profit or higher rents with-
out resistance worth mentioning, if these regions should yield considerably higher incomes in the fu-
ture (see below). But there seems to exist no practicable way to integrate this potential resource posi-
tion of the landlords into a quantitative analysis of class-relations.
Generally speaking, an analysis of classes in a village should not neglect entirely regio-
nal, or even international relationships of exploitation, like in the case of the export
oriented cocoa-farmers of Western Nigeria. Nevertheless this analysis will disregard these
relationships for the following reasons:
First, production of the Nupe peasants is directed almost entirely towards the internal
market, agricultural imports are of minor influence on supply and demand in Nupeland.
Second, the most important agricultural products of the Nupe, i. e. rice and guinea-corn,
are not traded by the ,,Marketing Boards", and therefore are not subject to indirect tax-
ation by the State. Third, the ruling class in the Bida Emirate consists of a coalition of
landlords, headed by the Fulam-dynasty in Bida, and a stratum of bureaucrats and mer-
chants, the emerging national bourgeoisie in Bida, which is closely interwoven with the
landlords (cf. Kohnert, 1978).
The influence of the urban bourgeoisie on rural relationships of exploitation, how-
ever, seems to be insignificant. Up to now members of this stratum who invest in land
consider this investment above all as security and social insurance in bad times; just six of
these families in Bida own a farm of more than 50 acres (but the largest private farm in the
whole Nupeland, 300 acres lati andfadama, belongs to a rich constructor in Bida). Trade
in most agricultural products is still decentralized, and significant monopolistic profits
are unlikely. Exploitation by usury is said to be negligible in Nupeland (cf. Nadel, 1942:
371-74).
4.2 The dissolution-process of the peasantry in four Nupe villages
The class-analysis given below is based on data collected during a field survey of 210 far-
mers in four Nupe villages from March 1976 to Nov. 1976. The most important source of
information were detailed questionnaire-interviews on the social and economic position
of the peasants, supplemented by both field visits together with the farmers in the case of
doubtful declarations, e. g. concerning farm size or products cultivated and harvested,
and informal interviews with village- and district authorities.
The quality of information therefore depended largely on the co-operation and the
memory of the peasants interviewed; the data are not claimed to be of absolute precision,
and in most cases represent relations or approximate values only; sensitive data like in-
formation on tribute and income are likely to be underestimated despite several cross-
checks applied. A separate study on the advantages and disadvantages of the ,,limited visit
technique" (cf. Collison, 1972:116-19, 225-47, 306-319) in general, and on the method-
ology applied in this survey in particular is underway.
The four villages surveyed are characterized by different stages of socio-economic de-
velopment; the relatively heavier weight on the backward villages in the total sample will
provide for a cautious valuation of the dissolution-process of the Nupe peasantry. Al-
though the villages selected are not representative for the study area in the statistical sense,
there is no indication that they are in any way unique, compared with other villages in the
same location; a detailed description of the selection criteria and the different natural- and
socio-economic conditions of the villages will be given in another context.Applied on these data, the classification model suggested above results in the outline of
class relations shown in Tab. 1 and 2; however, an interpretation of the results should
never forget the lack of information concerning the landlord class.
Tab. 1: Resource position of different classes in four Nupe villages, 1975/76
(average values per farm-household p. a., and relative frequency per class).
— — _______^^ class
resource position — — - ___^^
households per class
No. of residents
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1 See text for definition.
2 Rough standardized estimates: only the number of family members working on the farm, their
sex and age as well as their major tasks during the past agricultural year were asked for; this informa-
tion was standardized to male adult labour equivalents and multiplied by 138.6, i. e., the estimated
average number of days per male adult, worked on the family farm p. a. (cf. Norman, 1972: 23;
Baldwin, 1957: 133 and Kohnert, 1980 for a more detailed description).
3 Self-produced means of production, like storage facilities, etc., excluded.
4 In ,,upland-units": 1 zvce fadama = 3 acres upland.
5 Secondary income in kind excluded.
6 Declared rent only, see text.
7 Agricultural and non-agricultural income; income of wives and income from livestock ex-
cluded.
8 Proportion of income in kind in gross household income (in %).
t - test, separate variance estimate, SPSS-10, 1977 (one-tail prob.);
a Deviation opposite to next lower class significant on 1 % level;
b Deviation opposite to next lower class significant on 5 % level.


















































































1 Quantitative information on landlords not available.
2 Resident labourers only, the actual number of farm labourers by far exceeds these values, see
text.
3 The selection of respondents in Kuchi is not representative of the total population, as only such
farmers were selected who worked at least 10 days as farm labourers in 1975/76.
Source: Author's survey, 1976.
Considerable inequalities between under- and over-priviledged classes are obvious
(Tab. 1). Rich peasants, who constitute just 7 % of the households in the total sample,
have at their disposal more than 30 % of non-family labour employed (i. e. mainly hired
labour, but also certain forms of paid communal labour, egbe, dzoro), - about 21 % and
12 % of the cultivated marsh- and upland respectively, - more than 15 % of the net pro-
duction-value, - more than 21 % of the disposable income of all sample units, etc. The
high share of non-agricultural income in the case of rich farmers is the result of the excep-
tionally high salaries of two members of this class. Generally, capitalist farms in Nupe-
land are not merely the waste product of surplus-money of urban based merchants or L.
A. officers. Nearly half of the rich peasants dispose of a secondary income of less than N
100 p. a. and therefore have to finance their farm-business overwhelmingly from its own
profits. There is no statistically significant correlation between the level of secondary in-
comes and the extent of non-family labour employment.
Nevertheless the development of rural capitalism among the Nupe apparently is still in
its infancy: Even the majority of rich-peasant households depends to a considerable de-
gree on family labour, although their family labour input is far below the family labour
input of poor peasant families, despite the larger farms - and familiy size of rich farmers.
The value of the means of production employed by rich peasants, i. e., both the land
value and the expenditures on fertilizer, seed, insecticides, Tractor Hiring Service, etc., is
significantly higher than in all other classes, but in absolute terms it is still relatively low.
The low organic composition of capital of rich peasant farms may be taken as another sign
of the early stage of rural capitalist development. The dissolution process of the peasantry
became visible probably only 10 to 20 years ago. It may have been accelerated by the
enormous growth of the production for the domestic market in the 1950's, especially
concerning rice cultivation, which is still remembered by the peasants. The number of lo-
cal rice mills in Bida Division, which may be taken as growth-indicator, soared from one
mill in 1955 to 99 in 1976 (Files, Health Dept., Gbako L. G., Bida). The development of
commodity production has been promoted among others by three factors (for a detailed
account, cf. Kohnert, 1980):
a A growing demand for food from North- and East Nigeria, which made the Niger Province
and especially the Nupeland a granary of Nigeria: ,,Rice production is increasing everywhere and
particularly in Bida Division". ,,Niger Province . . . tends progressively to fill a role comparable to
1C18that played by the Canadian wheat fields in relation to the densely populated and bread eating coun-
tries of Northern Europe." (Provincial Annual Reports, 1954: 102; 1953: 107).
b The improvement of transport facilities and roads in Bida Division during the 1960's, es-
pecially the improvement of the inter-regional road-network, Bida-Mokwa, Tegina-Bida, and the
replacement of the ferry service across the Kaduna River by a bridge.
c Government promotion of agriculture by the creation of credit-and marketing co-operatives,
the distribution of fertilizer and seed to highly subsidized prices, construction of irrigation schemes
and the ,,Tractor Hiring Service", Group Farming, etc. (However, apart from fertilizer distribu-
tion, the effectiveness of these measures is open to question).
The survey shows (cf. tab. 2) that even within relatively small definable areas like Nu-
peland rural-capitalism may develop very unevenly and at different times (if at all):
The proportion of rich peasants in the total of farm households surveyed is twice as
high in the pioneer areas like the rice-producing fadamas of Jima (16 %) as in the upland
of Lemu (8 %); and in Dabba, Trans-Kaduna, where nearly half of the able-bodied
young men migrated to the urban centres around Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, this class has
hardly come into existence. These disproportionalities, however, cannot be taken as a
proof that the so-called integratmg-forces within the peasantry will prevent any dissolu-
tion-process on a larger scale.
The income from hired labour has been understated by the poor peasants for the rea-
sons given above. In addition, the proportion of hired labourers has been underestimatec
as well (tab. 2): Most of the farm labourers prefer to work far away from their mother-
town and therefore were underrepresented in their own villages; Kuchi is an exception-
ally good example for this case, since most of the young men of this hamlet were working
as seasonal migrants in the rice farms further south of Bida during the time of investiga-
tion. Nevertheless it is obvious that there exists nothing like a proletarisation of the peas-
antry: out of four farm labourers interviewed, just one owned no land or other means o:
production at all.
The family-household farm is still the most common economic unit in Nupe agricul-
ture; but it would be dangerous to derive from this fact assumptions on the stability anc
superiority of the smallholding economy in general or on specific social and economic le-
velling tendencies inherent to the peasantry in particular. On the contrary, customar)
frequency-distributions concerning acreage and income of peasant-households can onl)
reinforce the impression of rigid rural inequality, whereby these traditional indicators o
social stratification apparently even tend to overemphasize the existing differences (for ;
detailed critique of land/income per resident data without due regard to socio-economic
stratification between and within the families, cf. Kohnert, 1980):
Tab. 3: Acreage-distribution, cultivated land of farm-households in four Nupe villages
1975/76 (in % of cases per size-class and cumulative relative frequency of house














































Source: Author's survey, 1976.
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(Tab. 4: Distribution of monetary gross-income of farm households in four Nupe villages














































Monetary gross household income: Gini coefficient: 0.5811,
standardized coefficient of variation: 0.7555;
disposable household income: std. coef. of var.: 0.6008;
disposable income per resident: std. coef. of var.: 0.6130.
Source: Author's survey, 1976.
According to Tab. 3, peasant-households with farms larger than 20 acres, which con-
stitute just 7 % of the sample, possess more than a quarter (25.8 %) of the total area culti-
vated in the four survey-villages; whereas more than half of all farm households are smal-
ler than 7 acres and cultivate 23 % of the land only. Concerning the monetary gross in-
come, rural inequality stands out even stronger, - last not least due to the varying propor-
tion of non-agricultural income (especially salaries of L. A. employees). The majority of
the peasants (64 %) has to be content with an income of less than N 200 (gross money in-
:ome, income in kind excluded) p. a., whereas a small group of households (6.3 %),
which earns more than N 600 annually, receives about one third of the total money-in-
:ome of the sample (tab. 4).
f.3 Data on the relevance of social mobility in the countryside
A.S populist hypotheses on countervailing forces within the peasantry, which tend to level
ill economic inequalities in the long run, are not backed by the available data, another
:hesis will be forwarded here, which recently has been deduced from a similar empirical
Dackground (cf. Harrison, 1975; for a more detailed critique of demographic or life-cycle
differentiation theses cf. Kohnert, 1980): It is supposed that there exists nothing like a cy-
:lical mobility between groups of peasant households, but that the dissolution of rich fa-
nilies in the course of time tends to result in the ,,shedding of inefficient segments of the
:xtended family" and in a cumulation of social and economic advantages in subsequent
generations. Unfortunately, the survey of certain aspects of the family history of a num-
5er of peasant families, some results of which are given below, does not allow for a strin-
gent demonstration of this thesis; the reliability of the memory of the respondents con-
:erning historic events of the past six decades, which forms the base of the following in-
ormation, will hardly meet the requirements of sound statistical conclusions;
Both, the employment of non-family labour and the use of means of production like
ractors, irrigation-systems, fertilizer, insecticides, are on a remarkably high level in the
:ase of capitalist farmers, today as well as at the time of the beginning of the Civil War
1967), compared with non-capitalist households (tab. 5). A.s far as the respondents were
ible to provide information on the labour employment by their grandfathers at the time
)f Etsu Bello
9, indicators like the size of the efako labour groups of the extended family,
9 Etsu Bello (1916-26) is famous among del, 1942: 139/40; and pp. 241-52, 311-13 on
•Jupe peasants because he was the first to intro- labour organisation,
uce a motor-car in the country in 1918, cf. Na-the disposition of communal labour (egbe), and the disposal of serf labour (sofa), were di-
stinctively greater in the case of families which have been defined as rich (capitalist) pea-
sant families (in 1976) than in all other classes.
Tab. 5: Data on social mobility in four Nupe villages: Disposition of factors of production
per class at the beginning of trie Civil War (1967) and at the reign of Etsu Bella
(1916-26) (in %).
factors ^~~\^^ class
of prod. ^\^ 1975/76
households, employing
- farm-labourers in 1967
— egbe in 1967
- fertilizer in 1967
- tractors in 1967
- seed dressing in 1967
- irrigation systems in 1967
- farm-labourers in 1916/26
- egbe in 1916/26
- sofa in 1916/26
av. size of efako































































a Deviation between capitalist farmers and non-capitalist farmers (or middle peasants) sig-
nificant on 1 % level.
b Deviation between capitalist farmers and non-capitalist farmers (or middle peasants) sig-
nificant on 10 % level.
c Deviation between middle peasants and poor peasants/farm-labourers significant on 5 %
level.
d Deviation between middle peasants and poor peasants/farm-labourers significant on 10 %
level;
t-test, separate variance estimate, SPSS-1977, one-tail prob.
Source: Author's survey, 1976.
Differences concerning the use of bonded labour may indicate a relatively stronger
capital-position of the grandfathers of the rich peasants of today, compared with middle-
or poor peasants. The use of hired farm labour and eg^e-groups at the reign of Etsu Bello,
which is above the average, leads to the assumption that the rich peasant families had a
high social status and/or considerable financial-resources already two generations ago;
because in the past only village authorities were allowed to profit from this kind of com-
munal labour. The larger efako -groups, as well as the command of a greater labour-reser-
voir in general, allow to suppose, that rich peasant families on the average have had
greater chances to accumulate resources than other peasants.
More detailed information on the genealogies of some of the more important families
of Dabba points to the same direction: The foundations of the wealth of four of the six
most influential families of the village were laid already by their great-grandfathers; these
ancestors were known as traders in horses, gowns or cola-nuts besides being farmers; -
one of the great-grandfathers even reached the position of a councillor at the court of the
Etsu Nupe. Today the family-heads of all these households concerned do not live any
more in Dabba, but in Kaduna, Lagos or Ibadan, nevertheless they still have very strong
ties to the village community, as the formation of the ,,Dabba Social Club" by these fam-
ilies may show.
It therefore appears that a high socio-economic position of a peasant-family in the past
does influence positively the outlook of at least some of the inheriting descendants; apart
311from other factors the present class differentiation may be considered as a function of
these divergent prospects (on similar restrictions of social mobility in the Kano-Close-
Settled-Zone, cf. Hill, 1977: 141, 152, 156, 158).
4.4 On the development of class consciousness during the dissolution process of
the peasantry
Although marked social and economic differences between rich-, middle-, and poor
farmers emerged, this inequality has not yet become as manifest that it would be articulat-
ed as class consciousness by the individuals concerned; - at least not vis a vis strangers
with relatively high status, who might be suspected to be affiliated with the ruling class.
This lack of class consciousness, however, cannot be said to represent just the direct result
of a specific peasant culture, as it is in no way peculiar to the peasantry or the countryside
(cf. Lubeck's vivid account of the development of class consciousness among Hausa/Fu-
lani industrial workers in Kano, Lubeck, 1979: 308/9). Besides the early stage of rural
capitalist development three factors may blur the view of Nupe peasants concerning their
actual class position:
a There exists a well known status hierarchy among the Nupe, which is determined to a high
degree by wealth and income, - especially in the view of the younger generation of the villages,
which often refers to important persons not by their names but by the registration-number of their
cars. However, a system of social ranks, founded on age-grades, religion, occupation, and education
overlaps the economic grading: a poor peasant, for example, looks down upon the well-to-do Yo-
ruba immigrant in his neighbourhood, although the latter may even spare the money for a pilgri-
mage to Mecca and thus will obtain the desired title ,,Alhaji".
b Concern about social mobility rather than sentiments of group solidarity defines the nature of
class-consciousness (cf. Nadel, 1942: 134), - nowadays even among Nupe peasants. Indoctrinated
by the educational system, radio, and religion many young farmers hope that hard work and protec-
tion will secure them a white collar job in the cities. Thus they adhere to an ideology which shows fic-
titious ways out of their underprivileged position and causes the confusion of an imaginary future
with the existing inequalities, which are more likely to determine their future path through life.
c The rural-urban confrontation, which causes citizens of Bida or other towns to ridicule the vil-
lagers as ,,bush people", results in mutual distrust not only between town-people and villagers, but
even between the peasants of relatively advanced villages and more backward hamlets, and tends to
reinforce integrative mechanisms within the villages.
Whether the class consciousness especially of the poor- and middle peasants will be
consolidated in the next decades to that extent that the peasants will be able to articulate
their interests by their own, appears to be open to question
10. It depends mainly on the
future development of the dissolution-process of the peasantry, which is a function of so
many unknown variables that it is hardly to predict. The principal danger for the poor-
and middle peasants in Nupeland may be the present land-tenure system, which seems to
allow the landlord class to extend their claims of ownership (both in quantitative and
qualitative terms) in a,,legal" way to more and more parcels of land, if only it proves to be
profitable. Some of the irrigation projects, initiated and subsidised by the state and/or the
Native Authority, like the Edozighi irrigation scheme, developed in the early 1960's,
might herald two possible directions of future development: most of the farm plots of the
scheme were not given to the resident peasants but to members of the ruling class in Bida;
these paid the water-rate and either employed peasants on a share-crop base (50 % of the
yields to the owner, cf. Angulu, 1965:31), or invested directly in the project, by employ-
ing hired labour and more sophisticated methods of agricultural production, and made
,,excellent profits" of more than 100 %, as one of the landlords told me proudly. Devel-
opment trends similar to the lucrative capitalist offensive in the Awash valley, in north-
eastern Ethiopia, supervised in the 1960's by the Awash Valley Authority and foreign
owned agro-industries in co-operation with the Emir (cf. Bondestam, 1973), - or the
10 Cf. e. g. Baldus, 1977, on the semi-per- terest and subjective serf-consciousness in the
manent discrepancy between objective class in- case of the Machube, Northern Benin.
312transition of the traditional land-tenure system in favour of capitalist farmers like ir
Northern Ghana (cf. Shepered, 1978), cannot be excluded either; the large-scale devel-
opment and irrigation project, evaluated at present in Cis-Kaduna by the Work
Bank/FAO, or joint-ventures, like the sugar-cane plantation under construction in Sunt:
(Trans-Kaduna), will show very soon, whether the mass of the lower-class peasants wil.
be able to participate in the gains of the economic progress promised to the farmers in the
present electoral campaigns of the new political parties. But it would be dangerous tc
suppose that the increasing subordination of the peasants under the laws of commodity
production would automatically lead to progressive class-differentiation; strong
counteracting forces may develop like a considerable overall increase in the labour pro-
ductivity in agriculture which might match the relative decline of the income of poor anc
middle peasants; the decisive factor which determines the outlook of the peasantry, how-
ever, is considered to be the future attitude of the landlords, and that again, depend;
mainly on the question what kind of appropriation of the surplus-product will yield th«
highest profit for this class, - the extraction of rent in various forms or the employment oi
hired labour (cf. Schoer, 1977a).
Zusammenfassung
Die Kenntnis der sozialen Scbichtung innerbalb der Eauernscha.fi ist sine entscheidende Vorbedin
gung fiir breitangelegte wirtschaftspolitische Majlnahmen zur effektiven Forderung der Agrarpro
duktion in Ldndern der Dritten Welt. Nicht zuletzt aufGrund dieser Einsicht wenden sich auch it
Nigeria seit kurzem einige Sozialwissenschaftler dem Problem der bduerlicben Sozialstruktur zu
Dabei kam man bisher stets zu dem Ergebnis, daft zwar tiefgreifende soziale und wirtscbaftliche Un-
gleichheit zwischen den Bauern besteht, - man jedoch nicht von einer Klassendifferenzierung spre-
cben kann. Diese Schlufifolgerung spiegelt moglicherweise weniger die tatsdchliche Lage der Bauern
als vielmebr eine Fehlinterpretation des Klassen-Konzeptes wider.
Bin kritischer Uberblick iiber einige scbwerwiegende Miflinterpretationen des historisch-materia-
listischen Klassen-Konzeptes legt den Grundstein fur einen neuen Ansatz zur Analyse des Idndlicbet
Ranm.es in Nigeria. Angewandt aufeine sozio-okonomische Erbebung in vier Dorfern des Nupelan-
des, ^lord-Nigeria, im Jahre 1976, zeigt dieses Modell die Fruhstadien einer rural-kapitalistischer
Entwicklung, insbesondere unter den Reis produzierenden Marschbauern Cis-Kadunas auf; - eini
Entwicklung, die sich ungeachtet der Hindernisse des gegenwartigen semi-feudalen Landeigentum-
Systems vollzieht.
Weit verbreitete Annabmen iiber die Bedeutung sozialer Mobilitdt als Mittel des sozialen Aus-
gleichs werden durch die vorhandenen Daten nicht gestiitzt.
Resume
Ea connaissance des couches sociales a I'interieurde lapaysannerie estune condition prealable decisive
lorsqu'ils'agit d'appliquer a grande ecbelle des mesures depolitique economique encourageant effica-
cement la production agraire des pays du tiers monde. C'estpour cette raison entre autres que quel-
ques sociologues sepencbent depuispeu sur leprobleme de la structure socialepaysanne egalement au
Nigeria. Jusqu'ici on en venait toujoursa la conclusion qu'ilexiste bien deprofondes inegalites sociale*
et economiques entre lespaysans, -mais qu'on nepeut cependantparler d'une differentiation de clas-
ses. Cette conclusion refleteprobablement mains la situation effective despaysans que bienplutot unt
interpretation erronee du concept de classes.
Un survol critique de quelques fausses interpretations graves du concept de classes historico-mate-
nahstepose les fondements pour un nouveau debut d'analyse de I'espace rural au Nigeria. Applique a
une enquete socio-economique dans quatre villages dupays Nupe dans le Nigeria du Nord en 1976, ce
modele montre les premiers stades d'un developpement capitaliste rural, en particulier chez lespay-
sans du Cis-Kaduna producteurs de nz; — un developpement qui s'accompht en depit des obstacles du
systeme semi-feodal actuel de la propriete fonciere.
Les hypotheses largement repandues concernant I'importance de la mobilite sociale en tant que
moyen de compensation sociale ne sont pas appuyees par les donnees disponibles.BIBLIOGRAPHY:
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